

October 2, 1974

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

James
I have asked several times
to see the ground rules,
get an idea what all is being
requested, and have something
I can show HAK to give him
a feel for the dimensions of
the exercise.

Must we piecemeal
it in the island this way?
B

NSA review completed.

NSA review completed

MEMORANDUM

NSA review completed

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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ATTACHMENTS

October 2, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Jeanne W. Davis *JWD*

SUBJECT: Murphy Commission Wishes to See NSCID's

William Harris, the RAND consultant who is in charge of the greater portion of the Murphy Commission's study of the intelligence community, is scheduled to see Dick Ober on Monday morning, October 7. He has indicated that he wishes to read the NSC Intelligence Directives. Harris will have SI and TS clearances. Copies of the Directives are attached.

CIA believes and our staff agrees, that we have no alternative to showing the NSCID's to Harris, without giving him copies or permitting him to take notes.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize Dick Ober to permit Mr. Harris to read the attached NSCID's when he sees Dick on Monday.

Approve *BO*

Disapprove _____

Other _____

Attachments

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ATTACHMENTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1¹

BASIC DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(Effective 17 February 1972)

The intelligence effort of the United States is a national responsibility and must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources of the Government and to satisfy the intelligence requirements of the National Security Council and of the departments and agencies of the Government. For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. *Overall Coordination*

The Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate the foreign intelligence activities of the United States in accordance with existing law and applicable directives. Such coordination shall include those forms of intelligence that constitute the foreign intelligence activities of the United States.

2. *The National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC)*

The National Security Council Intelligence Committee will be comprised of: The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chairman; The Attorney General; The Director of Central Intelligence; The Under Secretary of State; The Deputy Secretary of Defense; and The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The National Security Council Intelligence Committee will give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer.

3. *The Director of Central Intelligence*

a. The Director of Central Intelligence will discharge four major responsibilities:

(1) Planning, reviewing and evaluating all intelligence activities and the allocation of all intelligence resources.

(2) Producing national intelligence required by the President and other national consumers.

(3) Chairing and staffing all intelligence community advisory boards and committees.

(4) Establishing and reconciling intelligence requirements and priorities within budgetary constraints.

¹ This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 1 dated 4 March 1964.

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b. The Director of Central Intelligence shall prepare and submit each year, through the Office of Management and Budget, a consolidated intelligence program/budget as directed in the Presidential memorandum of 5 November 1971. In preparing the program/budget, the Director of Central Intelligence will take into account such considerations as the comparative effectiveness of collection programs and the priorities of intelligence targets.

c. The Director of Central Intelligence shall act for the National Security Council to provide for detailed implementation of National Security Council Intelligence Directives by issuing, after appropriate consultation, such supplementary Director of Central Intelligence Directives as may be required. Such directives shall, as applicable, be promulgated and implemented within the normal command channels of the departments and agencies concerned.

d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall formulate, as appropriate, policies with respect to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

e. The Director of Central Intelligence shall make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters to appropriate United States officials.

f. The Director of Central Intelligence shall develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

g. Director of Central Intelligence Directives to be issued in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph c above shall include:

(1) General guidance and the establishment of specific priorities for the production of national and other intelligence and for collection and other activities in support thereof and their formal transmission to the National Security Council.

(2) Establishment of policy, procedures and practices for the maintenance, by the individual components of the intelligence community, of a continuing interchange of intelligence, intelligence information and other information with utility for intelligence purposes.

h. The Director of Central Intelligence, or representatives designated by him, in consultation with the head of the intelligence or other appropriate component of the department or agency concerned, shall make such surveys of departmental intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the National Security Council and to coordinate the intelligence effort of the United States.

i. In making recommendations in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security, the Director of Central Intelligence shall transmit therewith a statement indicating the dissenting views of the members of the United States Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee in matters relating to intelligence production and resource management.

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Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC).

An Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee is hereby established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence on the preparation of the intelligence budget and the allocation of resources among programs and to ensure that they are employed in accordance with approved requirements with no unwarranted duplication. It will consist of the Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman, and senior representatives of the Department of State, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget.

5. *The United States Intelligence Board (USIB).*

a. A United States Intelligence Board is hereby established under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence. Subject to other established responsibilities under existing law and directives, the United States Intelligence Board will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to:

- (1) The establishment of appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities.
- (2) The production of national intelligence.
- (3) The supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material.
- (4) The protection of intelligence sources and methods.
- (5) As appropriate, policies with respect to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

b. The membership of the United States Intelligence Board shall consist of the following: The Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman; The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Vice Chairman; the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; The Director, National Security Agency; a representative of the Secretary of the Treasury; a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission; and a representative of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman, shall invite the chief of any other department or agency having functions related to the national security to sit with the United States Intelligence Board whenever matters within the purview of his department or agency are to be discussed.

c. The Board shall be provided with a Secretariat staff, which shall be under the direction of an Executive Secretary appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence. Subordinate committees and working groups shall be established, as appropriate, by the Director of Central Intelligence.

6. *National Intelligence*

a. National intelligence is that intelligence required for the formulation of national security policy, concerning more than one department or agency, and transcending the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. The Director of Central Intelligence shall produce national intelligence that will carry a statement of abstention or any substantially differing

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opinion of a United States Intelligence Board member or of the Intelligence Chief of a Military Department.

b. Departmental intelligence is that intelligence which any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

c. Interdepartmental intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions, but transcending the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce. Such subcommittee structure of the United States Intelligence Board as may be established by the Director of Central Intelligence may be utilized for the production and dissemination of interdepartmental intelligence.

d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall disseminate national intelligence to the President, members of the National Security Council, as appropriate, members of the United States Intelligence Board and, subject to existing statutes, such other components of the Government as the National Security Council may from time to time designate or the United States Intelligence Board may recommend. He is further authorized to disseminate national intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence on a strictly controlled basis to foreign governments and international bodies upon his determination after consultation with the United States Intelligence Board that such action would substantially promote the security of the United States, provided that such dissemination is consistent with existing statutes and Presidential policy, including that reflected in international agreements; and provided further that any disclosure of Federal Bureau of Investigation intelligence information shall be cleared with that agency prior to dissemination. Departmental intelligence and interdepartmental intelligence produced outside the United States Intelligence Board subcommittee structure may be disseminated in accordance with existing statutes and Presidential policy, including that reflected in international agreements.

e. Whenever any member of the United States Intelligence Board obtains information that indicates an impending crisis situation that affects the security of the United States to such an extent that immediate action or decision by the President or the National Security Council may be required, he shall immediately transmit the information to the Director of Central Intelligence and the other members of the United States Intelligence Board, as well as to the National Indications Center and to other officials or agencies as may be indicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central Intelligence shall immediately prepare and disseminate, as appropriate, the national intelligence estimate of the situation.

7. Protection of Intelligence and of Intelligence Sources and Methods

The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice of the members of the United States Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Each department and agency shall remain responsible for the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods within its own organization. Each shall also establish appropriate in-

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ternal policies and procedures to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that agency of intelligence information or activity. The Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon the departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of intelligence sources or methods. A report of these investigations, including corrective measures taken or recommended within the departments and agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for review and such further action as may be appropriate, including reports to the National Security Council or the President.

a. Authorized Disclosures

The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and assistance of the United States Intelligence Board, shall establish procedures for review by intelligence authorities of all classified intelligence information contemplated, proposed or prepared for release to the public or for use or disclosure in other unclassified activities in the course of which there is danger that intelligence sources and methods might be revealed. Intelligence information that has been authorized for unclassified disclosure shall be released, used or utilized only in the form and manner authorized under the established review procedures.

8. Community Responsibilities

a. In implementation of, and in conformity with, approved National Security Council policy, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

(1) Seek the attainment of the following objectives as essential to the efficient and effective functioning of the intelligence community:

(a) The responsiveness of the United States intelligence effort with respect to national requirements must be subject to continuing review.

(b) Authoritative and responsible leadership for the community as a whole must be assured.

(c) A more efficient use of resources by the community in the collection of intelligence information must be achieved. Utilization of the means available must be in consonance with approved requirements of United States security and national interests.

(d) Assignment of intelligence functions within the community must be reviewed and revised to eliminate inefficient, unnecessary or outmoded activities.

(e) The quality, scope and timeliness of the community's product must be improved.

(f) The provision of intelligence and its utilization must enhance the formulation of the foreign and economic policies of the United States Government and the planning for and conduct of military operations by United States forces.

(2) Call upon the other departments and agencies, as appropriate, to ensure that on intelligence matters affecting the national security the in-

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telligence community is supported by the full knowledge and technical talent available in or to the Government.

(3) Ensure that the pertinence, extent and quality of the available foreign intelligence and intelligence information relating to the national security is continually reviewed as a basis for improving the quality of intelligence and the correction of deficiencies.

(4) Take appropriate measures to facilitate the coordinated development of compatible referencing systems within the departments and agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities. Central reference facilities as a service of common concern shall be provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and/or other departments and agencies, as appropriate.

(5) Make arrangements with the departments and agencies for the assignment to, or exchange with, the Central Intelligence Agency of such experienced and qualified personnel as may be of advantage for advisory, operational or other purposes. In order to facilitate the performance of their respective intelligence missions, the departments and agencies concerned shall, by agreement, provide each other with such mutual assistance as may be within their capabilities and as may be required in the interests of the intelligence community for reasons of economy, efficiency or operational necessity. In this connection primary departmental interests shall be recognized and shall receive mutual cooperation and support.

(6) Be provided with all information required from all departments and agencies of the Executive Branch required for the exercise of his responsibilities.

b. Insofar as practicable, in the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities for the production of intelligence, the several departments and agencies shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of other departments and agencies and shall make full use of existing capabilities of the other elements of the intelligence community.

c. The departments and agencies of the Government shall establish appropriate policies and procedures to control and limit undesirable publicity relating to intelligence activities.

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NSCID No. 2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE NO. 2¹

COORDINATION OF OVERT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES

(Effective 17 February 1972)

To promote sound and efficient utilization of the several departmental and agency collecting and reporting facilities in the interests of national security, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the following overall policies and objectives shall apply to the interdepartmental coordination of overt foreign intelligence collection activities (such as open broadcast monitoring and document collection) not covered by other National Security Council Intelligence Directives, such as National Security Council Intelligence Directives 4, 5 and 6.

1. The Director of Central Intelligence shall ensure that planning for the utilization of the collecting and reporting capabilities for intelligence purposes of each of the several departments and agencies avoids undesirable duplication and uncoordinated overlap and provides adequate coverage for national security purposes.


2. The Department of State shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection abroad, i.e., outside the United States and its possessions, of political, sociological, economic, scientific and technical information.

3. The Department of Defense shall have primary responsibility for, and shall perform as a service of common concern, the collection of military intelligence information. Because of the importance of scientific and technical intelligence to the Department of Defense and the military services, this collection responsibility shall include scientific and technical, as well as economic information directly pertinent to Department of Defense missions.

4. The Central Intelligence Agency may collect intelligence information abroad in support of assigned functions or as a by-product of the assigned functions, provided that this collection involves no undesirable duplication of any of the specific assignments in paragraphs 2 or 3 above, and provided that any such overt collection is coordinated with the Department of State or with the Senior U.S. Representative.

5. The senior U.S. representative in each nation or foreign jurisdiction where the United States maintains official representation shall coordinate in his area the collection activities not covered by other National Security Council Directives. Full utilization shall be made of the assigned duties, individual initiative, or favorable contacts of departmental and agency representatives.

¹This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 2 dated 18 January 1961.



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6. Intelligence information collected abroad in accordance with the terms of this Directive by any agency in the field shall, wherever possible, be transmitted immediately to the field representatives of the agency primarily responsible for carrying out the foreign collection activity as delineated in paragraphs 2, 3 or 4 above, who shall then be responsible for its onward transmission, provided that the original collector shall not be enjoined from transmitting the information to his own headquarters.

7. The Central Intelligence Agency, as a service of common concern, shall be responsible for the selective exploitation within the United States of nongovernmental organizations and individuals as sources of foreign intelligence information, in accordance with policies, procedures and practices established as provided in NSCID No. 1 by the Director of Central Intelligence.

8. The Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct, as a service of common concern, monitoring of foreign radio and television propaganda and press broadcasts required for the collection of intelligence information to meet the needs of all departments and agencies in connection with the national security and shall disseminate such intelligence information to the several departments and agencies that have an appropriate interest therein.

9. The Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct the exploitation of foreign language publications for intelligence purposes, as appropriate, as a service of common concern. The Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate this activity with similar activities maintained by the departments and agencies to satisfy their own requirements.

10. Departments and agencies carrying out the collection activities mentioned above shall recognize, in establishing collection programs, the needs of the other departments and agencies.

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NSCID No. 3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE NO. 3¹
COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION
(Effective 17 February 1972)

For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence production activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that the following overall policies, objectives, categories of intelligence and allocations of responsibility be established.

I. Basic Intelligence

a. Basic intelligence is that factual intelligence that results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a fundamental and more or less permanent nature and that, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available.


b. An outline of all basic intelligence required by the Government shall be maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency in collaboration with the appropriate departments and agencies. This outline shall be broken down into chapters, sections and subsections, which shall be allocated as production and maintenance responsibilities to the Central Intelligence Agency and/or to those other departments or agencies of the Government that are best qualified by reason of mission, production capability, and primary interest to assume the production and maintenance responsibilities. To ensure the production of the basic intelligence required by the Government and the fullest possible use of current departmental and agency capabilities, changes in the outline or allocations of production and maintenance responsibilities shall be effected by agreement between the Director of Central Intelligence and the departments and agencies concerned.

c. Basic intelligence required in the interest of national security shall be compiled and continuously maintained in National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) to cover foreign countries, areas or broad special subjects, in accordance with National Security Council-approved NIS Standard Instructions and inter-departmental-approved amendments thereto. The National Intelligence Surveys will be disseminated in such form as shall be determined by the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of the departments and agencies concerned.

d. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for coordinating production and maintenance and for accomplishing the review, publication and dissemination of these National Intelligence Surveys, and shall make such

¹This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 3 dated 18 January 1961.

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requests of the departments and agencies as are necessary for proper development and maintenance of the Surveys.

e. Departments or agencies to be called on for contributions to this undertaking may include other than those represented permanently on the United States Intelligence Board.

2. Current Intelligence

a. Current intelligence is that intelligence of all types and forms of immediate interest usually disseminated without the delays incident to complete evaluation or interpretation.

b. The Central Intelligence Agency and the several departments and agencies shall produce and disseminate such current intelligence as may be necessary to meet their own internal requirements. The current intelligence produced by the Central Intelligence Agency is produced primarily to meet the needs of the President, National Security Council and other high-level consumers; in addition, it serves the common needs of the interested departments and agencies of the Government for current intelligence that they themselves do not produce. The departments and agencies will contribute to the Central Intelligence Agency current intelligence items and publications as appropriate and on a timely basis.

3. Departmental intelligence is that intelligence any department or agency requires to execute its own mission.

4. Interdepartmental intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence required by departments and agencies of the Government for the execution of their missions but transcending the exclusive competence of a single department or agency to produce. Joint intelligence is a special category of interdepartmental intelligence jointly produced by defense intelligence organizations in the performance of the assigned missions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such subcommittee structure of the United States Intelligence Board as shall be established by the Director of Central Intelligence may be utilized for the production and dissemination of such forms of intelligence.

5. National intelligence is that intelligence required for the formulation of national security policy, concerning more than one department or agency and transcending the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. The production of national intelligence is covered in NSCID No. 1. Intelligence relating to the national security that has been produced as interdepartmental or departmental intelligence may also, when appropriate, be submitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for issuance as national intelligence by the Director of Central Intelligence as provided in NSCID No. 1.

6. Each department or agency, taking full cognizance of the facilities of the other agencies, shall maintain adequate research facilities to accomplish its departmental intelligence production mission and to provide such additional intelligence within its field of primary responsibilities as may be necessary to satisfy other requirements relating to the national security.

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7. To ensure that the capabilities of the departments and agencies are utilized effectively for the production of intelligence of common concern, the following division of interests, subject to refinement through a continuous program of coordination and evaluation by the Director of Central Intelligence to promote an integration of effort and to avoid undesirable duplication, shall serve as a general delineation of primary responsibilities:

a. The Department of State shall produce political and sociological intelligence on all countries and economic intelligence on countries of the Free World.

b. The Department of Defense shall produce military intelligence. This production shall include scientific, technical and economic intelligence directly pertinent to the missions of the various components of the Department of Defense.

c. The Central Intelligence Agency shall produce economic, scientific and technical intelligence. Further, the Central Intelligence Agency may produce such other intelligence as may be necessary to discharge the statutory responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence.

d. The production of intelligence on atomic energy is a responsibility of all departments and agencies represented on the U.S. Intelligence Board with responsibilities for the production of finished intelligence, to be coordinated through the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee structure.

8. Despite the above-mentioned allocations of primary production responsibilities, there will be areas of common or overlapping interest that will require continuing interagency liaison and cooperation. In the event that a requirement for intelligence is established for which there is not existing production capability, the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the United States Intelligence Board, shall determine which of the departments and agencies of the intelligence community can best undertake the primary responsibility as a service of common concern.

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NSCID No. 4

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE NO. 4¹THE DEFECTOR PROGRAM
(Effective 17 February 1972)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council, with the concurrence of the Attorney General of the United States regarding the domestic aspects of this program, hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. *For the purposes of this directive:*

a. Defectors are defined as nationals of the USSR, People's Republic of China, Romania, Poland, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Yugoslavia, North Korea, Cuba, North Vietnam and Mongolia, who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and who are of special value to the U.S. Government because:

- (1) they are able to add valuable new or confirmatory information to existing U.S. intelligence knowledge;
- (2) they are of operational value to a U.S. department or agency; or
- (3) their defection can be psychologically exploited to the advantage of the United States.

b. Inducement is an act committed or manifestly instigated by a U.S. official and demonstrably intended to bring about a defection for which the U.S. Government might, if the act were discovered, be called upon to account.


2. The provisions of this directive may be applied, in whole or in part, to cases involving nationals of countries other than those listed above when the Director of Central Intelligence determines such action to be in the best interests of the United States.

3. Defections should be encouraged and induced, employing both conventional and unconventional means, whenever the net effect on U.S. political, diplomatic and security interests would not be adverse.

4. Prior to the initiation of an inducement operation by any U.S. department or agency, consideration should be given to:

- a. the possibilities of successfully carrying out a productive recruitment in place rather than an outright defection;
- b. the potential value to the United States of recruitment as opposed to defection;
- c. the danger of possible deception;
- d. the propaganda value of the possible defection.

¹This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 4 dated 15 September 1958.



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5. Overt publicity and propaganda exploitation of a defector proposed by a department or agency must be approved by the Director of Central Intelligence in agreement with the Department of State and implemented in coordination with the Department of State and the United States Information Agency.

6. When the President so directs or in active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged this directive is inapplicable.

7. Except as provided in paragraph 9 below, the Director of Central Intelligence shall coordinate all activities authorized herein, including but not limited to:

a. liaison with the intelligence and security services or other interested elements of foreign governments on defector matters; and

b. utilization of the resources and capabilities of all U.S. Government departments and agencies, in support of the program.

8. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 9 and 10 below, the Central Intelligence Agency shall have primary responsibility for the conduct of the Defector Program and shall perform certain services of common concern in support thereof.

9. In cases involving defection within the United States the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have jurisdiction. The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be primarily responsible for inducement, recruitment in place and operational use in a clandestine capacity, in view of its statutory responsibilities in the internal security field.

10. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 above, other departments and agencies may conduct supplemental activities abroad in support of the Defector Program, including the inducement of defection and liaison concerning defector matters. The Secretary of State will advise all U.S. departments and agencies with regard to U.S. Government refugee and defector policies and programs. Personnel of nonintelligence agencies (e.g., Coast Guard, Bureau of Customs) likely to be in a position involving possible contact with defection candidates should be briefed on U.S. policy.

11. In areas outside the United States and its possessions, the Senior U.S. Representative shall be responsible for determining the manner and degree to which actions contemplated toward a defector may affect the diplomatic and political interests of the United States.

12. Policies, procedures and practices for the implementation of responsibilities outlined above shall be established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

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NSCID No. 5

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE

DIRECTIVE NO. 5¹

U.S. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES ABROAD

(Effective 17 February 1972)

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. *For the purpose of this directive:*

a. Espionage is defined as that intelligence activity directed toward the acquisition of information through clandestine means.

b. Counterintelligence is defined as that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and undertaken to protect the security of the nation and its personnel, information and installations against espionage, sabotage and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating or repressing individuals, groups or organizations conducting such activity.

2. To ensure centralized direction through prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities authorized herein, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, after appropriate consultation:

a. Establish the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and coordination, including the assessment of risk incident upon such operations as compared to the value of the activity, and to ensure that sensitive operations are reviewed pursuant to applicable directives.

b. Coordinate all clandestine activities authorized herein and conducted outside the United States and its possessions, including liaison that concerns clandestine activities or that involves foreign clandestine services, except when the provisions of paragraph 8 apply; also coordinate clandestine activities with overt collection abroad.

c. Invite departments and agencies not permanent members of the United States Intelligence Board that have clandestine counterintelligence responsibilities abroad to participate in deliberations of the Board when clandestine counterintelligence matters affecting such responsibilities are under consideration.

d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with other departments and agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence

¹This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 5 dated 18 January 1961.

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Agency and coordinate the arrangements for cover support required by any other department or agency to carry out the clandestine activities authorized in paragraph 4 below, except when such cover is to be provided unilaterally and without utilizing the facilities of, or becoming identified with other departments or agencies of the government or nongovernmental organizations.

e. Resolve disputes arising in the coordination of U.S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities abroad.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency has primary responsibility for U.S. clandestine activities abroad. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, it is responsible for the following services of common concern:

a. The conduct of espionage outside the United States and its possessions in order to meet the intelligence needs of all departments and agencies concerned, in connection with the national security.

b. The conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions.

c. The conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services or, concerning the above clandestine activities, with foreign intelligence or security services.

d. The maintenance for the benefit of the intelligence community of central indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information. All departments and agencies shall contribute to this index, on a continuing basis, such material collected by them as is appropriate for a central file; this material shall be collated and analyzed for appropriate dissemination.

e. Upon request and to the extent practicable, assisting other departments and agencies in connection with their cover and support needs.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above, other departments and agencies with commands or installations located outside the U.S. and its possessions may:

a. conduct supplementary espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;

b. conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities and installations;

c. conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or, concerning the above clandestine activities, with foreign intelligence or security services.

5. The departments and agencies concerned shall assist the Central Intelligence Agency in its conduct of espionage by providing guidance in the form of continuous, timely and specific collection requirements and, as required, assessments of the value of the information collected. Such departments and agencies shall provide similar support to each other as required. Conversely, the Central Intelligence Agency shall assist other departments and agencies by providing, as practicable, assessments of the value to national intelligence of the information derived from the activities of other agencies as authorized herein.

6. In a foreign area, except where paragraph 8 applies, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Secretary of State, ensure that

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the senior U.S. representative, or his designated representative, is appropriately advised on a timely basis of U.S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities conducted in or affecting the area.

7. In a foreign area where major U.S. military commands are stationed, the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the senior U.S. military commanders, or their designated representatives, appropriately informed of the espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities and operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in or from such areas, including liaison between the Central Intelligence Agency and foreign military establishments.

8. In active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged, or when the President so directs:

a. Except as provided in subparagraph b below, the entire Central Intelligence Agency organization conducting espionage and clandestine counterintelligence operations in or from a theater shall, as a component force, be under the direct command of the U.S. Theater Commander, in accordance with agreements separately reached between the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, and shall provide espionage and counterintelligence support to military operations.

b. Espionage and counterintelligence operations that because of some exceptional political, diplomatic or other implications, are conducted independently by the Central Intelligence Agency, shall be coordinated by the Director of Central Intelligence with the Secretary of Defense and with the Secretary of State.

c. The Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence shall establish general procedures for the coordination of liaison on clandestine activities between U.S. military commanders and foreign services that engage in such activities.

9. In addition to the above, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

a. Develop appropriate policy recommendations for National Security Council consideration with respect to the overall U.S. counterintelligence effort conducted outside the U.S. and its possessions.

b. To the extent necessary to ensure conformity with policies approved by the National Security Council, provide for the coordination of all types of U.S. counterintelligence activities conducted abroad and for the coordination of such activities with those conducted by the departments and agencies responsible for domestic counterintelligence.

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WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE NO. 6¹

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
(Effective 17 February 1972)

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which comprises Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and the activities pertaining thereto are national responsibilities and must be so organized and managed as to exploit to the maximum the available resources of the Government, to satisfy the intelligence needs of the National Security Council and the departments and agencies of the Government, and to provide for efficiency and economy in the use of technical resources. Therefore, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council authorizes and directs that SIGINT activities shall be conducted as prescribed herein.

1. *Definitions*

For the purpose of this directive, the terms "Communications Intelligence" or "COMINT" shall be construed to mean technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.

COMINT activities shall be construed to mean those activities that produce COMINT by the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by radio, wire or other electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by the processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted. Collection comprises search, intercept and direction finding. Processing comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption, study of plain text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results.

COMINT and COMINT activities as defined herein shall not include (a) any intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, press and propaganda broadcasts, or (b) censorship.

ELINT activities are defined as the collection (observation and recording), and the processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is the technical and intelligence information product of ELINT activities.

2. *The Director of Central Intelligence*


Consistent with his responsibilities as set forth in NSCID Nos. 1, 2 and 3, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:

- a. Establish with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board and issue appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities to guide the conduct of all United States SIGINT activities.

¹ This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 6 dated 15 September 1958, revised 18 January 1961.

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b. Review the needs and performance of United States SIGINT activities as a basis for preparing a consolidated intelligence program budget.

c. Establish policies and procedures for the conduct of SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board.

d. Develop and establish policies and procedures for the protection of SIGINT including the degree and type of security protection to be given SIGINT activities through the protection of information about them or derived from them.

3. The Secretary of Defense

a. The Secretary of Defense is designated as Executive Agent of the Government for the conduct of SIGINT activities in accordance with the provisions of this directive and for the direction, supervision, funding, maintenance and operation of the National Security Agency. The Director of the National Security Agency shall report to the Secretary of Defense and shall be the principal SIGINT adviser to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Secretary of Defense may delegate in whole or part authority over the Director of the National Security Agency within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

b. The Secretary of Defense may determine, after consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence, that a SIGINT matter forwarded by the Director of Central Intelligence to the National Security Council for decision presents a problem of an emergency nature and requires immediate action. His action will be implemented and will govern, pending a decision by the National Security Council.

4. The National Security Agency

a. There is established under the Secretary of Defense and subject to his authority and control a National Security Agency with a Director who shall be head thereof and a Deputy Director who shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability. The Director and Deputy Director shall be designated by the Secretary of Defense subject to the approval of the President. The duration of their appointments shall be at the pleasure of the President. The Director shall be a commissioned officer of the armed services, on active or reactivated status and shall enjoy not less than three star rank during the period of his incumbency. The Director shall have a Deputy who shall be a career civilian with SIGINT experience.

b. It shall be the duty of the Director of the National Security Agency to provide for the SIGINT mission of the United States, to establish an effective unified organization and control of all SIGINT collection and processing activities of the United States, and to produce SIGINT in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice of the United States Intelligence Board. No other organization shall engage in SIGINT activities except as provided for in this directive.

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c. Except as provided in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this directive, the Director of the National Security Agency shall exercise full control over all SIGINT collection and processing activities, except the operation of mobile SIGINT platforms which will normally be exercised through appropriate elements of the military command structure. The Director of the National Security Agency is authorized to issue direct to any operating elements engaged in SIGINT operations such instructions and assignments as are required. All instructions issued by the Director under the authority provided in this paragraph shall be mandatory, subject only to appeal to the Secretary of Defense.

d. In consonance with the aims of maximum overall efficiency, economy and effectiveness, and to the extent he deems necessary and desirable, the Director shall centralize and consolidate the performance of SIGINT functions for which he is responsible. To this end, there is established a Central Security Service under the Director of the National Security Agency, which shall be organized in accordance with a plan approved by the Secretary of Defense. It shall be principally collection oriented and shall include SIGINT functions previously performed by various Military Department and other United States governmental elements engaged in SIGINT activities. The Director of the National Security Agency shall determine the appropriate division of responsibilities among the elements under his direction.

e. The Armed Forces and other departments and agencies often require timely and effective SIGINT. The Director of the National Security Agency shall provide information requested, taking all necessary measures to facilitate its maximum utility. As determined by the Director of the National Security Agency or as directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the National Security Agency shall provide such SIGINT either through the direction of activities under his control or through the delegation to an appropriate agent of specified SIGINT facilities and resources from among the elements under his direction for such periods and for such tasks as appropriate.

f. Specific responsibilities of the Director of the National Security Agency include the following:

(1) Formulating necessary operational plans, policies and procedures to provide for integrated operations.

(2) Managing SIGINT resources, personnel and programs.

(3) Conducting research and development to meet the needs of the United States for SIGINT.

(4) Determining and submitting to the authorities responsible for logistic support for activities under his control requirements together with specific recommendations as to what each of the responsible departments and agencies of the Government should supply.

(5) Prescribing within his field of authorized operations requisite security regulations covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution of SIGINT material within and among the elements under his control; and exercising the necessary monitoring and supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations.

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(6) Providing the Director of Central Intelligence with such information as he may require on the past, current and proposed plans, programs and costs of the SIGINT activities under the control of the Director of the National Security Agency.

g. The intelligence components of individual departments and agencies may continue to conduct direct liaison with the National Security Agency in the interpretation and amplification of requirements and priorities within the framework of objectives, requirements and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

h. It is the intent of this directive that the National Security Agency not engage in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence, but be limited to the production and dissemination of COMINT and ELINT.

5. Relationship to other SIGINT Activities

a. (Distributed separately through Restricted channels.)

b. Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique requirements for clandestine operations covered under NSCID No. 5. Those SIGINT collection and processing activities (other than cryptanalysis) that are specifically designated by the Director of Central Intelligence to be essential and integral to the operation of clandestine espionage and counterintelligence activities abroad, including arrangements with foreign clandestine services, shall be conducted under the provisions of that directive. To the extent practicable, however, information pertaining to the activities and derived therefrom shall be handled so as to give suitable protection to related SIGINT activities. Material collected under these circumstances that would have been considered COMINT or ELINT will be passed to the National Security Agency to the extent desired by the Director of the National Security Agency as soon as special security requirements of the collector have been satisfied.

c. The Director of the National Security Agency shall conduct such COMINT and ELINT activities as are required to support electronic warfare activities. The conduct of such search, intercept, direction-finding, range-estimation, and signal analysis of non-communications electromagnetics radiation as must be undertaken to permit immediate operational use of the information in support of electronic measures and countermeasures and rescue operations, if delegated by the Director of the National Security Agency, shall be the responsibility of the Military Departments or Commands, as appropriate. The responsibility for such activities with respect to electromagnetic radiations of COMINT interest shall normally not be delegated and shall remain the responsibility of the Director of the National Security Agency.

6. The Federal Bureau of Investigation

Nothing in this directive shall be construed to encroach upon or interfere with the unique responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the field of internal security, including such intercept and processing activities as may be undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in connection with its functions.

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
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21 March 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of NSCID No. 6

SUBJECT : Prohibition on Overseas Distribution

Distribution of NSCID No. 6 outside of the forty-eight contiguous States is prohibited. Recipients are requested either to insert this notice under the security cover sheet or to make an appropriate entry on the first page of each copy of the directive.


T. W. KARWASINSKI
Chief, Acquisition & Dissemination Division

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE NO. 7¹

CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS

(Effective 17 February 1972)

Pursuant to Sections 101 and 102, as amended, of the National Security Act of 1947, in order that the President and other members of the National Security Council may be provided with timely "critical intelligence," the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. There shall be established communications means for the most timely transmission of critical intelligence as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection and designation of relative priority for the transmission of critical intelligence. The definition and establishment noted above will be subject to continuing review under procedures to be established by the Director of Central Intelligence.


3. The Secretary of Defense shall be the Executive Agent of the Government to provide for the establishment, operation and perfection of such communications means necessary to provide the most timely transmission of critical intelligence to higher authorities. In the execution of this responsibility, he shall effect coordination with other Government agencies in order that their communications facilities may be utilized to the extent deemed practicable and efficient.

4. The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the communications requirements of the intelligence community for the transmission of critical intelligence.

¹This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 7 dated 15 September 1958.

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NSCID No. 8

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE NO. 8¹

PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION

(Effective 17 February 1972)

For the purpose of ensuring the most effective, timely and economic exploitation of photography as a source for foreign intelligence relating to the national security, and pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby directs that the following policies, responsibilities and procedures shall be recognized and established:

1. Policies

To ensure that the capabilities of the departments and agencies represented on the United States Intelligence Board are most efficiently utilized for the foreign intelligence exploitation of photography, the following basic principles shall apply:

a. No complete separation of interest is possible or desirable in photographic intelligence activities.

b. Departments and agencies represented on the United States Intelligence Board shall continue to be individually responsible for photographic interpretation and the production of photographic intelligence in support of established departmental or agency responsibilities and the utilization of such photography and related collateral information in the production of intelligence, such as, warning intelligence, orders of battle, estimates, technical intelligence, precise geodetic data, targeting, maps, charts, matrices or other targeting materials and related research and development.

c. To promote an integration of effort and to avoid unnecessary duplication and expense, a coordinated interdepartmental approach to the exploitation of photographic intelligence shall be established.

d. Subject to applicable security measures and on a "need-to-know" basis, there shall be full interchange of all pertinent photographs and photographic intelligence analysis among the departments and agencies concerned.


e. Certain photographic intelligence functions can be best performed as a central service of common concern, for the maximum benefit of the entire intelligence community.

2. Centralized Responsibilities

a. A National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) shall be provided as a service of common concern by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(1) The Director of the National Photographic Interpretation Center shall be designated by the Director of Central Intelligence with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense.

¹This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 8 dated 18 January 1961.

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(2) The United States Intelligence Board departments and agencies engaged in photographic intelligence production shall jointly provide appropriate personnel and other support for the NPIC, as agreed by them with the Director of Central Intelligence. Such supporting personnel shall be functionally under the direction of the Director, NPIC, for joint activities, but shall remain administratively responsible to their parent organizations.

(3) The administration of NPIC in time of war shall be transferred to the Secretary of Defense.

b. Foreign intelligence related photography shall be made available from photographic processing facilities to the NPIC and to designated photographic intelligence units of United States Intelligence Board departments, agencies and commands simultaneously, and without delay for preliminary analysis, within the bounds of any special security controls required.

c. The NPIC shall provide on a selective basis for the preliminary, rapid interpretation of photographic detail, including, where possible, tentative identification of such detail, and shall make appropriate distribution of such preliminary interpretations, with supporting references to appropriate related collateral information, to interested elements of the community.

d. It is the intent of this directive that the NPIC not engage in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence. Photography that appears to be primarily of departmental or agency significance shall be the primary exploitation responsibility of the department or agency concerned. The Center, itself, shall produce and disseminate NPIC photographic interpretation reports (based on an analysis of photography using other sources to assist in this interpretation) and provide other materials and services, in support of the national intelligence effort and approved Priority National Intelligence Objectives.

e. The NPIC shall also furnish such additional support to departmental and agency interests as can be provided without degradation of activities already specified in paragraphs 2.c. and 2.d. above.

f. The NPIC shall maintain on a selective basis a consolidated central file of photographic data as a service of common concern. It shall make arrangements for the exchange of photographs and photographic data with other photographic collections in the intelligence community, and shall make appropriate recommendations to facilitate the coordinated development of compatible codes, indexes and mechanized systems for the efficient recovery, selection and collation of available photographic data.

g. The NPIC shall engage in or sponsor, as appropriate, the development of specialized equipment for the intelligence exploitation of photography, and shall provide information about such specialized equipment to interested elements of the intelligence community for their own possible use or further adaptation.

h. The NPIC shall examine and make recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence, as appropriate, as to any special security controls required.

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SECRET**3. Coordination**

In discharging its responsibilities the NPIC shall consult, as appropriate, with individual departments, agencies and committees of the United States Intelligence Board. The intelligence chief of each department or agency represented on the United States Intelligence Board shall coordinate photographic intelligence activities within his parent organization with the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

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